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Abstract 
Public sector unions around the world are under threat from political forces. Combined, the financial 
crisis and austerity measures have challenged public sector unions’ legitimacy. In the U.S., the post-
recession assault on public sector unions is rooted in political ideology, with not only a widening po-
larization along the liberal-conservative spectrum playing a key role, but cultural cognition and eco-
nomic downturn, too. This research provides a comparative historical analysis of changes in public 
sector collective bargaining rights at state and local levels in 50 states. The article describes the varia-
tions in public sector industrial relations at the state and local levels in the short and medium term. It 
also proposes a theoretical model to explain similar and diverging patterns which can be observed 
across the states. 
 
Keywords: public sector labour relations, United States, austerity, regional differences (JEL: H61, H62, H63, 
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Arbeitsbeziehungen des öffentlichen Sektors in den Vereinigten 
Staaten: Austerität, Politics und Policy 
Zusammenfassung 
Gewerkschaften des öffentlichen Dienstes sehen weltweit ihre Legitimation in Frage gestellt und sind 
bedroht durch politische Gegner, die Finanzkrise und Sparmaßnahmen. In den USA wurzelt der An-
griff auf die Gewerkschaften des öffentlichen Dienstes in politischer Ideologie, insbesondere der zu-
nehmenden Polarisierung im liberal-konservativen Spektrum, dem Feld der kulturellen Kognition und 
des wirtschaftlichen Abschwungs. Der Beitrag liefert eine historisch-komparative Analyse der Verän-
derungen Rechte des collective bargaining im öffentlichen Dienst auf staatlicher und lokaler Ebene 
aller 50 Staaten der USA. Dabei werden die kurz- und mittelfristigen Veränderungen der industriellen 
Beziehungen des öffentlichen Dienstes auf staatlicher und lokaler Ebene beschrieben und darüber 
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hinaus ein Modell zur Erklärung von Ähnlichkeiten und Abweichungen zwischen den Bundesstaaten 
vorgeschlagen.  
 
Schlagwörter: Arbeitsbeziehungen des öffentlichen Sektors, USA, Austerität, regionale Differenzen 
1. Introduction
Public sector labour unions exist at the intersection of work, public policy, and public val-
ues. As a result, public sector unions in industrialized countries occupy a unique position of 
power. The sources of power include: politicians, voters, and the state’s role in the econo-
my as a distributor and overseer of public goods and services (Dixon & Martin, 2012). The 
public sector’s reliance on tax revenues to fund public goods and services means that em-
ployers may prioritize factors such as social well-being in making employment decisions 
rather than purely financial factors.  
In the private sector, maintaining union-free status translates into greater profits for busi-
nesses. Moreover, private sector managers are more likely to be terminated or have their ca-
reer advancement stalled if a union organizing drive takes place on their watch (Freeman & 
Kleiner, 1990). In contrast, public sector managers are more likely to involve employees in 
collaborative decision making (Morse, 2008) and less likely to reap a direct financial benefit 
from opposing unions. Hence, public sector managers have fewer incentives to oppose unions 
than managers in the private sector do (Kearney & Mareschal, 2014). 
Public sector workers differ from their private sector counterparts in several important 
ways. Public sector workers in the U.S. are much more likely to be represented by unions than 
are workers in the private sector. In 2015, union representation in the state and local public 
sector was 39 percent. In contrast, only 7.5 percent of workers in the private sector were cov-
ered by collective bargaining agreements in 2015 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). 
Women and minorities make up a greater percentage of the public sector workforce 
than of the private sector workforce. In 2014, women comprised 60 percent of the state and 
local workforce as compared to 47 percent in the private sector. Likewise, 13 percent of 
state and local government employees were African American compared to about 11 per-
cent in the private sector (Current Population Survey, 2014). 
The public sector has more professional jobs and fewer low-skilled jobs than the pri-
vate sector. On average, public sector workers are better educated compared to private sec-
tor employees. Over half of full-time state and local public sector employees hold at least a 
four-year college degree compared to about a third of full-time employees in the private 
sector (Lewin, Kochan & Keefe, 2012).  
Some of these patterns hold true in other western industrialized democracies as well. 
For example, public sector unions in the U.K. have greater strength than private sector un-
ions as measured by membership and density (Barratt, 2009). Also like in the U.S., the pub-
lic sector workforce in the U.K. includes more women and its members have greater levels 
of education and professionalization (Matthews, 2010). In Canada, 70 percent of public sec-
tor workers are members of unions. Similarly, the public sector labour movement in Canada 
consists of more women, professional, and white collar workers than the private sector la-
bour movement (Ross & Savage, 2013). 
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Yet, public sector unions in the U.S. generally operate in a hostile environment. In par-
ticular, they lack the institutional protections provided elsewhere in the world. Public sector 
unions in the U.S. never achieved the status of “social partners” at the national level like 
their counterparts in Europe (Hyman, 2005). To illustrate, in the U.K. the Whitley Report 
implied that the government should serve as a “model employer” by setting policies that al-
lowed working people to improve their standard of living (Carter & Fairbrother, 1999). The 
Whitley Report helped create a system of collective bargaining with joint consultation be-
tween government employers and unions at the national level and regional joint councils at 
the local government level (Corby & Symon, 2011). In contrast, the U.S. neglected to es-
tablish comparable goals for government employers.  
The labour movement in the U.S. has remained vital largely because public sector un-
ions increased membership while private sector unions were faltering. One of the main po-
litical benefits of public sector unions is that they have members in most states and Con-
gressional districts (Wilson, 2012). The primary drawback of this shift to state and local 
government as the arena for American unionism is that with the weakening of private sector 
unions, public sector union members are pitted against residents and homeowners. This 
group of stakeholders has an interest in minimizing the cost of state and local government 
in order to keep their tax burden low (Goldfield & Bromsen 2013). 
In keeping with the themes of continuity, change, and crises, this paper traces the 
emergence of public sector unions in the U.S. and contemporary challenges to the public 
sector labour movement posed by state and local government responses to the financial cri-
sis of 2008. This study uses historical comparative analysis to describe the variations in 
public sector industrial relations at the state and local levels. In addition, it offers a theoreti-
cal explanation for similar and diverging patterns of response to economic shocks across 
the states. The conclusion discusses ongoing challenges for organized labour, the implica-
tions for democracy, social, and economic well-being, and the balance of power between 
management and workers. 
2. A Brief History of Public Sector Unions 
2.1 Arrested Development 
Although several public sector unions were established in the late 1800s and early 1900s, 
they did not really begin to gain strength until the 1960s. Several factors limited the growth 
of public sector unions early on: the sovereignty argument, the nature of government em-
ployment, and an intolerant legal environment (Kearney & Mareschal, 2014). Opponents of 
public sector unions maintained that bargaining with public employees would distort repre-
sentative democracy by putting the demands of public employees ahead of the demands of 
other citizens and stakeholders (Malin, 2012). In essence, the doctrine of sovereignty was 
used to portray collective bargaining as an illegal delegation of citizens’ self-determination. 
Members of the conservative movement continue to frame their opposition to public sector 
unions as a sovereignty issue today.  
The composition of the state and local government workforce also played a role in the 
public sector unions’ pace of development. With the implementation of the merit system 
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during the progressive era, public employment became increasingly professionalized. The 
merit system provided security and protections against management abuses and served as a 
form of union substitution. In addition, women and minorities were drawn to public em-
ployment in the 1960s and 1970s as an attractive alternative to private sector employment 
(McCartin, 2006). Traditionally the U.S. labour movement has faced challenges organizing 
workforces with substantial numbers of white collar employees, women, and minorities.  
Moreover, the legal environment was not conducive to public sector bargaining. Public 
employees’ early attempts to form and join unions were often thwarted by the legal prece-
dent set in 1892 by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in McAuliffe v. the City of New Bed-
ford. In that case Justice Holmes argued that public employees forfeited their right to organ-
ize as a condition of accepting public employment (Kearney & Mareschal, 2014). The Bos-
ton police strike of 1919 further dampened the prospects of public sector unionism. The 
National Guard was called in to put down the strike and violence erupted. Many local gov-
ernments responded by banning all types of public sector unions (Slater, 2013). Justice 
Holmes’ arguments endured and were utilized as recently as 1963 by the Michigan Su-
preme Court in the case of AFSCME Local 201 v. City of Muskegon to prevent police offic-
ers from forming a union (Malin, 2012). 
2.2 The Rise of Public Sector Unions 
The legal framework protecting workers’ rights to participate in workplace decisions and 
join together for mutual aid in the private sector was established with the passage of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935. However, the NLRA excluded federal, state, 
and local governments from coverage. Collective bargaining rights in the public sector were 
established nearly three decades later and differ across sectors of the government.  
Although the public sector lagged behind the private sector in establishing collective 
bargaining rights, public sector unionism grew dramatically beginning in the 1960s and 
1970s. This was due in part to the passage of laws that protected collective bargaining at the 
state and local levels. Wisconsin was the first state to pass a public sector collective bar-
gaining law in 1959. Other states soon followed suit. By the late 1970s, a majority of states 
had enacted laws permitting collective bargaining for at least some public sector employees 
(Slater, 2013). 
The rise of public sector unions was accelerated by the build-up of grievances and pres-
sures combined with shocks to the system (Goldfield & Bromsen, 2013). Viewed in this 
way, the development of public sector labour unions was a natural response to conflicts. A 
variety of factors spurred public sector organizing including a growth in government, pri-
vate sector spillover effects, and social change. 
At the national, state, and local levels government budgets grew after WWII. As a re-
sult, administrative units expanded rapidly, especially in public education. Large, concen-
trated government employment units facilitated union organizing (Goldfield, 1989). In 
terms of spillover effects, public sector unions’ success in organizing members and negoti-
ating contracts was tied to strength in the private sector labour movement. Specifically, the 
private sector unions helped legitimatize the public sector’s demands and build political 
support (Cantin, 2012). Over this time period large numbers of young people and minorities 
entered the public service. Both groups were receptive to unionization (Barrett, 1973).  
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2.3 Contemporary Challenges to the Public Sector Labour Movement 
As noted earlier, with the weakening of private sector unions, public sector union members 
have become caught up in a class war in which they are pitted against taxpayers. Conserva-
tives contend that the fiscal problems of state and local governments are caused by ineffi-
cient government and selfish public sector unions who bargain for excessive pay and bene-
fits for their members. These challenges are driven by the reinventing government move-
ment and a changing economy which exacerbates income inequality. 
The reinventing government movement gained traction around the world in the early 
1990s. Regardless of location, the common conceptual thread is anti-government bias. The 
reinventing government movement made it acceptable for politicians, practitioners, and ac-
ademics to advocate weakening public sector unions, shrinking government, and sanction-
ing public servants (Hood, 1991). It is rooted in a political ideology aimed at disempower-
ing public employees and undermining the career civil service (Kearney & Hays, 1998).  
Adherents of the movement advocate outsourcing and decentralization to diminish the 
size and scope of government, and managerialism to make public employees more similar 
to private sector employees. For example, the Director of Georgia’s Commission on Privat-
ization noted that the civil service system was rigid and inflexible, and went on to say, “We 
don’t believe that public employees should have any protection that the private employees 
don’t have … Why should government be any different?” (Hansen, 1995, p. 16). Taken to-
gether, outsourcing, decentralization, and managerialism strengthen the role of the private 
sector in providing public services and reallocate power from the legislative to the execu-
tive branches of government (Kearney & Hays, 1998).  
Proponents of outsourcing at the local government level contend that it promotes effi-
ciency, equity, and local voice. However, Hefetz, Warner, and Vigoda-Gadot (2012) find 
that local government outsourcing efforts produce lacklustre results regarding voice, effi-
ciency, and equity. Instead, local governments use contracting to replace full-time public 
employees with less expensive part-time employees and circumvent civil service protec-
tions for public employees (Fernandez, Smith & Wenger, 2007). The degree of outsourcing 
in local governments ranges from a small subset of services to what is known as extreme 
contracting in which all services are outsourced and only a handful of in-house staff are re-
tained (Bradbury & Waechter, 2009).  
At the level of state government, the executive branch tends to lead the reform efforts 
(Brewer & Kellough, 2016). For governors, the primary goal of reform efforts is to gain 
greater political control over public employees. The tactics used to achieve this goal are to 
reduce civil service protections for public employees, increase managerial discretion, im-
plement pay-for-performance systems, and transfer governmental functions to private con-
tractors (Barzelay, 2001; Hood, 1991). For example, Governors Zell Miller in Georgia, Jeb 
Bush in Florida, and Mark Sanford in South Carolina championed radical civil service re-
forms that combined decentralization and at-will employment (McGrath, 2013). All of 
these reforms raise concerns about constitutional provisions for equal protection and due 
process, yet they have frequently been implemented with little systematic investigation of 
their impact on core personnel management functions (Jordan & Battaglio, 2014).  
Public sector unions also face challenges due to rising inequality brought on by a 
changing economy. During the Great Recession (2007-2009), workers in middle-skilled 
Public Sector Labour Relations in the United States 455 
white- and blue-collar positions experienced severe job losses. Over the same time period, 
employment in highly-skilled white-collar fields such as professional, managerial, and 
technical positions remained stable. Employment in low-skilled service sector occupations 
such as food service, housekeeping, and personal care also held steady (Autor, 2010). This 
polarization in employment is not unique to the U.S. Similar trends are evident in the Euro-
pean Union (Autor, 2010; Goos, Manning & Salomons, 2009). 
Workers with less than a bachelor’s degree make up 67 percent of the adult population 
in the U.S. (Ryan & Bauman, 2016). The loss of middle-skill, blue-collar jobs has been es-
pecially detrimental to men with low levels of education. The remaining job prospects open 
to them are primarily concentrated in low-wage service occupations (Autor, 2010). Dis-
placed male workers in the U.S. have not adapted well to the changing economy. That is, 
they have not pursued higher education and have balked at taking service sector jobs they 
perceive as women’s work. Moreover, they have expressed anger and resentment towards 
women, African Americans, and public sector workers, whom they perceive as having an 
unfair advantage in economic progress (Hochschild, 2016). 
After the financial crisis of 2008, Republican governors and the conservative move-
ment used this polarization to fuel a politics of resentment among citizens. Specifically, 
Republicans and their corporate allies have portrayed public sector workers as a privileged 
class that enjoys better pay and benefits than private sector workers (Cantin, 2012; McCar-
tin, 2012). Similarly in Canada, public sector unions have been cast as greedy villains who 
threw the government into debt and are therefore to blame for austerity policies (Ross & 
Savage, 2013). This framing of the argument encourages the working class and taxpayers to 
direct their anger over the changing economy towards public sector unions instead of the 
financial industry which played a key role in triggering the Great Recession. 
3. The Public Sector Collective Bargaining Environment Today 
3.1 Political Context 
At the state and local levels, public sector unions have traditionally formed alliances with 
Democratic politicians. The labour movement in the U.S. evolved into a social democratic 
bloc in the political arena that successfully advocated for the expansion of the welfare state 
(Lichtenstein, 2011). Although it has been criticized for supporting the Democratic Party, 
this alliance is not unfounded. Democrats are more likely to champion the policies unions 
seek (Rosenfeld, 2014). 
Public sector unions exercise power by making contributions to political campaigns. For 
example, in the 2016 election cycle, public sector unions donated $59,837,282 to federal can-
didates, parties, and outside groups. Roughly 89 percent of the contributions supported Demo-
crats (Center for Responsive Politics, n.d. a). The top three contributors were the National Edu-
cation Association (NEA), the American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees 
(AFSCME), and the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) (Center for Responsive Politics, 
n.d. b). The Service Employees International Union (SEIU), a hybrid union representing both 
public and private sector employees, contributed $31,772,264 to federal candidates, parties, 
and outside groups in the 2016 election cycle (Center for Responsive Politics, n.d. c).  
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In addition to monetary donations to candidates, public sector unions communicate 
with their members about policy issues and candidates’ voting records. They encourage 
members to reach out to elected officials to discuss their concerns and engage in lobbying 
efforts to preserve public services, strengthen workers’ rights, improve working conditions, 
secure fair wages, protect workers’ safety, and safeguard the clientele they serve. In 2016 
public sector unions spent $13,320,270 on lobbying (Center for Responsive Politics, n.d. d).  
Despite some bipartisan efforts, there is a long history of opposition to unions on the 
political right. Some of the early efforts to thwart unionism include creation of the National 
Right to Work Committee (NRTWC) in 1955. The NRTWC fought against what it defined 
as compulsory unionism (McCartin, 2012). As often happens in media discourse and public 
opinion (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), the NRTWC countered arguments for the right to 
join a union with arguments for the right to not join.  
Although these efforts were initially aimed at private sector unions, over the past four 
decades anti-union forces on the right have strategized and mobilized to dismantle public 
sector collective bargaining rights. Borrowing policy from the NRTWC, the Public Service 
Research Council (PRSC) pursued similar tactics to limit collective bargaining in the public 
sector. In the early 1970s, the Republican Party opposed the creation of the National Public 
Employee Relations Act (NPERA) (Cantin, 2012).  
Partisan politics played a role in restricting public employees’ political activities through 
amendments to the Hatch Act in 1976, 1990, and 1993 (Gely & Chandler, 2000). Specifically, 
60 percent of Republicans in the House of Representatives and 75 percent of Republicans in 
the Senate voted against loosening restrictions on public employees’ political activities. In 
contrast, 92 percent of Democrats in the House of Representatives and 96 percent of Demo-
crats in the Senate supported the reform amendments (Gely & Chandler, 2000). Thirty-five 
state governments have enacted similar restrictions, often referred to as little Hatch Acts, on 
public employees. These restrictions prohibit a variety of activities including taking an active 
part in political campaigns, providing or soliciting financial or staffing assistance to any polit-
ical organization or candidate, and holding political positions while in government. 
3.2 Socioeconomic Context 
Following the financial crisis of 2008, opposition to public sector collective bargaining has 
intensified and spread to Northern industrial states such as Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio and 
New Jersey. The conservative movement blamed public employees for state and local 
budget crises, contending that public employees’ salaries and benefits outstripped compen-
sation levels in private sector (Cantin, 2012). However, the data on public employees’ 
compensation does not support these arguments.  
Bender and Heywood (2010), Lewis and Galloway (2011), and Keefe (2012) demon-
strate that, on average, state and local employees are slightly under-compensated compared 
to private sector workers. Estimates of the average rate of under-compensation range from 
3.7 to 7.4 percent. The earnings disparity increases substantially for college educated work-
ers. State and local governments pay college-educated workers on average 25 percent less 
than private employers (Keefe, 2012).  
On the other hand, the public sector establishes a floor on compensation for workers 
with low levels of education. The compensation of workers with a high-school education or 
Public Sector Labour Relations in the United States 457 
less tends to be higher for state and local government employees compared to similarly ed-
ucated workers in the private sector (Keefe, 2012). Workers in this category are likely to be 
in low-skilled occupations such as groundskeepers, janitors, garbage collectors, and food 
service. These positions are often the first targets of outsourcing. 
Even Democratic governors in New York and California joined the fray, claiming that 
public sector employees’ benefits, especially pensions, were not sustainable and needed to 
be curtailed (McCartin, 2012). As of 2011, the shortfall for state and local government pen-
sion plans was estimated at $1 trillion. The bulk of this shortfall, $850 billion, may be at-
tributed to the stock market collapse in 2007-2009. An additional $80 billion of the shortfall 
is the result of state and local governments reducing or suspending their contributions to the 
funds during the economic crisis (Baker, 2011).  
Overall this shortfall represents less than 0.2 percent of the state gross product over the 
next 30 years (Baker, 2011). Given that pension plans’ investment returns involve a long-
time horizon, correcting for these shortfalls is not an insurmountable task for most state and 
local governments. In fact, many of the attacks on public pension systems have been driven 
by The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). ALEC is a conservative policy 
organization funded primarily by corporations, corporate trade groups, and corporate foun-
dations. ALEC develops model legislation for weakening public programs and disseminates 
its plans to state and local government officials. Some of its most prominent corporate as-
sociates include: Koch Industries, Altria/Phillip Morris, Corrections Corporation of Ameri-
ca, and Connections Academy (an online education corporation). 
Although some public pensions have faced under-funding crises, the system as a whole 
provides security and cost-effective retirement options for employees and taxpayers. As of 
September 2015, state and local government pension systems held assets of $3.56 trillion 
(National Association of State Retirement Administrators [NASRA], 2016). Over the peri-
od from 1990-2015, public pension funds have exceeded their assumed rate of investment 
returns despite the occurrence of three economic recessions and four years when median 
investment returns were negative (NASRA, 2016).  
3.3 State Political Systems 
In the U.S. states have the freedom to determine the structure of their legislatures. The 
number of members of the legislature, the length of terms, and legislative procedures and 
rules vary across states. Beginning in the 1960s, there was a move to professionalize state 
legislatures to give them the capacity to address complex problems and to provide a coun-
terbalance to the office of the governor.  
The concept of professionalization measures the ability of legislators to make policy 
decisions. The key components of professionalization are legislators’ compensation and 
benefits, time demands of service, and the staff and resources available to the legislators 
(Squire, 1988). Applying this concept, Squire and Moncrief (2015) categorized legislatures 
as professionalized (full-time service, relatively high salaries, and larger staff/better access 
to resources) and citizen (part-time services, lower salaries, fewer staff/resources).  
The partisan composition of the legislatures and the executive branch matter. Republi-
can governors have initiated radical civil service reforms. State legislatures are more likely 
to enact radical civil service reforms that strip public employees of workplace protections 
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and expose them to political control by elected officials when the following conditions are 
present: Republicans are in control politically, their majority in the legislature is sizable, 
and public sector unions lack sufficient power to resist (McGrath, 2013).  
3.4 Labour Relations Policy Framework 
Given the failure to pass NPERA in the 1970s and the lack of subsequent national policies, 
public sector collective bargaining rights are set at state and local government levels and 
remain highly fragmented. The legal system governing collective bargaining for state and 
local government employees varies across the 50 states and within states. The end result is 
a patchwork system of collective bargaining (see Table 1). For example, 30 states and the 
District of Columbia have laws granting all public employees the right to bargain collec-
tively, while 12 states limit collective bargaining rights to specific occupational categories.  
 
Table 1: Status of Collective Bargaining Rights in the States, 2014 
Grant all public employ-
ees collective bargaining 
rights 
Limit collective bargain-
ing rights to specific oc-
cupational categories 
Lack a policy permitting 
collective bargaining 
Expressly prohibit collec-
tive bargaining 
Alaska, California, Connecti-
cut, Delaware, Florida, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Maine, Massachusetts,  
Michigan, Minnesota,  
Missouri, Montana, Nebras-
ka, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico,  
New York, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,  
Rhode Island, South Dakota, 
Vermont, Washington, West 
Virginia, Wisconsin*  
Alabama, Colorado, Geor-
gia, Idaho, Indiana, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Nevada, 
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
Wyoming 
Arkansas, Arizona, Loui-
siana, Mississippi, Oklaho-
ma, South Carolina 
North Carolina, Virginia 
*Technically Wisconsin grants collective bargaining rights to all public employees. At the same time, 
a law passed in 2012 prohibits bargaining over working conditions and benefits, and restricts 
wage increases to changes in the Consumer Price Index.  
Source: Data from state websites, legislative summaries, and various newspaper articles 
 
Of the remaining eight states, six states lack a policy permitting public sector collective 
bargaining. However, informal bargaining often occurs in these states through meet and 
confer processes, local ordinance, and on an ad-hoc basis at the discretion of elected offi-
cials and administrators. The other two states, North Carolina and Virginia, have passed 
legislation specifically prohibiting collective bargaining (Kearney & Mareschal, 2014). The 
multitude of bargaining structures established across states and localities through legisla-
tion, judicial decisions, and executive orders, results in highly decentralized bargaining. 
This in turn weakens the power of public sector unions. 
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4. Methods 
This study uses historical comparative analysis to examine the transformation of public sec-
tor industrial relations across all 50 states. It has two primary goals. The first is to observe 
and describe patterns that occur across cases. The second is to engage in theory building 
through the development of propositions (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Yin, 2013) and the ap-
plication of a conceptual framework (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Figure 1 provides the conceptual framework for analysing patterns of change across 
states. The key components of the model are the states’ socioeconomic environment, politi-
cal context, political system, labour relations policy, and public sector unionization. The fo-
cus here is on political context as measured by citizen ideology, political system as meas-
ured by professionalization of the legislature and control of the branches of government, la-
bour relations policy framework as measured by new laws introduced and enacted, and 
changes in public sector unionization as measured by union density. 
In the socioeconomic context tight budgets often lead to retrenchment of public em-
ployees’ rights. In this regard, the financial crisis of 2008 impacted all state and local gov-
ernment budgets across the U.S. Proposition 1: The deflation of the housing bubble, the fi-
nancial crisis of 2008, and the Great Recession served as shocks to the socio-economic en-
vironment of public sector unions. This opened the pathway for attacks on public sector 
unions. 
 
Figure 1: A comprehensive model of state and local government unionization 
 
Source: Adapted from Kearney and Mareschal (2014) 
 
The political culture of each state also plays a role. Political culture serves as a filter that in-
fluences individuals’ positions on contentious policy issues. In the U.S., political culture 
spans the continuum between a hierarchical/individualist view of society at one end and an 
egalitarian/communitarian view at the other end (Hogler, Hunt & Weiler, 2015). Specifical-
ly, it is expected that a shift toward a more conservative political culture will be associated 
with declining union density. Proposition 2: Changes in political culture will be associated 
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with changes in collective bargaining rights. As a state’s political culture becomes more 
conservative, public collective bargaining rights will be reduced. As a state’s political cul-
ture becomes more liberal, public collective bargaining rights will be maintained or ex-
panded. 
The state political system is comprised of factors such as legislative professionalism, 
executive-legislative relations, and interparty competition. Legislative professionalization is 
an indicator of the legislative branch’s ability to counterbalance the executive branch and 
make well-informed policy decisions. It is expected that professional legislatures will con-
duct independent policy analysis and therefore be less likely to be influenced by ALEC’s 
model legislation. Proposition 3: Professional legislatures will preserve public sector col-
lective bargaining rights and will be associated with stable union density. Proposition 4: It 
is expected that Republican control of all branches of government will be associated with 
attempts to reduce public sector collective bargaining rights and declining union density.  
In terms of the labour relations policy framework, there is a clear connection between 
union membership and the scope of collective bargaining. States with the most comprehen-
sive bargaining rights have the highest levels of unionization. Similarly, it is expected that 
the introduction and enactment of laws restricting public sector collective bargaining rights 
will be associated with declining union density. Although not every piece of legislation in-
troduced at the state level is enacted, the continual need for unions to lobby against restric-
tive measures draws down the resources available to service members and conduct internal 
and external organizing. Proposition 5: The introduction and enactment of laws restricting 
public sector collective bargaining rights will be associated with declining union density. 
5. Results: Patterns Across the States 
The Great Recession sent tremors through the public sector union movement that continue 
to reverberate today. During the 2010 elections a faction calling itself the Tea Party gained 
power inside the Republican Party. The Tea Party faction drove the Republican Party fur-
ther to the right of the political spectrum and accelerated attacks on civic institutions and 
social programs (Hogler, 2015). ALEC’s model legislation served as the basis for many of 
the efforts to rescind public sector collective bargaining rights at the state and local levels. 
Support for the Republican Party has been growing since the 1960s. The shifting bal-
ance of partisan support along with advancements in the Tea Party policy agenda hastened 
the weakening of collective bargaining rights. Table 2 shows changes in political ideology 
over the period of 2008-2013. Each state was evaluated with a possible range of scores 
from 0-100. Lower scores denote political conservatism; higher scores denote political lib-
eralism.  
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Table 2: Political Ideology 2008-2013 
Conservative States Liberal States 
2008 Ideology Scores 
< 50 (listed from most 
conservative to least 
conservative) 
2013 Ideology Scores 
< 50 (listed from most 
conservative to least 
conservative) 
2008 Ideology Scores 
> 50 (listed from most 
liberal to least liberal) 
2013 Ideology Scores 
> 50 (listed from most 
liberal to least liberal) 
Oklahoma Utah Massachusetts Connecticut 
Wyoming Oklahoma Rhode Island Vermont 
Idaho Wyoming Connecticut Massachusetts 
Utah Idaho Vermont Hawaii 
Georgia Arkansas Hawaii Rhode Island 
Mississippi Kansas New York Maine 
Kansas Nebraska Maine New York 
Louisiana Alabama New Jersey Delaware 
Nebraska Tennessee West Virginia Maryland 
South Carolina Texas Maryland Alaska 
Alabama Indiana Delaware New Jersey 
Arizona Kentucky Oregon California 
Texas South Carolina Illinois New Mexico 
  Louisiana Pennsylvania Oregon 
  Georgia Washington Michigan 
  North Carolina Michigan Washington 
  South Dakota Minnesota Pennsylvania 
  Iowa New Mexico Illinois 
  North Dakota North Dakota Minnesota 
  Missouri Ohio New Hampshire 
  Florida California   
  Arizona Wisconsin   
  Virginia Missouri   
  Mississippi Alaska   
  Nevada Montana   
  Wisconsin Virginia   
  West Virginia Arkansas   
  Colorado Nevada   
  Ohio Iowa   
  Montana Florida   
    North Carolina   
    South Dakota   
    Colorado   
    Indiana   
    New Hampshire   
    Tennessee   
    Kentucky   
Source: Adapted from Berry, Fording, Ringquist, and Hanson (2015).  
https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/ 
 
State scores under 50 were determined to be politically conservative and scores above 50 
were determined to be politically liberal. During the period, the number of states with con-
servative ideology grew from 13 in 2008 to 30 in 2013. Between 2008 and 2013 political 
ideology scores became more conservative in all but four states. The mean score decreased 
by 9.48 points, from 59.32 in 2008 to 49.84 in 2013.  
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The evidence does not fully support Proposition 2. Of the 30 politically conservative 
states, 17 experienced a decline in union density and two experienced no change in union 
density. Unexpectedly, union density increased in 11 of the politically conservative states. 
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) modifies schema for classifying 
state legislatures developed by Squire and Moncrief (2015) to include an intermediate cate-
gory. Using this modified schema, legislatures are categorized as Green (full-time, well-
paid, large staff), Gray (hybrid), and Gold (part-time, low pay, small staff) (National Con-
ference of State Legislatures [NCSL], 2014). Table 3 shows the distribution of states along 
this schema.  
 
Table 3: Types of Legislatures 
Green/Professional Gray/Hybrid Gold/ Citizen 
California, New York, Pennsylvania 
Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin 
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, Missouri, Ne-
braska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Or-
egon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Tex-
as, Virginia, Washington 
Montana, New Hampshire, North Dako-
ta, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming 
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Missis-
sippi, Nevada, New Mexico, Rhode Is-
land, Vermont, West Virginia 
Adapted from: Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, NCSL (2014) http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-
state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures.aspx#green 
 
Within the Green/Professional category, three states have longer legislative sessions and 
larger districts. These are California, New York, and Pennsylvania. All three experienced 
moderate declines in union density. Thus, the evidence did not support Proposition 3. 
As of March 2017, Republicans controlled 32 state legislatures, 33 state governorships 
and had party control (both legislative and governorship) of 24 states. Democrats controlled 
14 legislatures and 16 governorships with party control of seven states. The states of Colo-
rado, Connecticut, and Maine had split legislatures, and Nebraska has a non-partisan uni-
cameral legislature. Additionally, one state, Alaska, had an independent governor. Table 4 
shows the distribution of states by political control. 
The evidence provides weak support for proposition 4. Of the 24 states with Republi-
can control of the legislature and governorship, 13 experienced a decline in union density, 
two experienced no change in union density, and nine experienced increases in union densi-
ty. 
The states of Indiana, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Michigan were at the forefront of the roll-
back of public sector collective bargaining rights. These states passed laws that eliminated 
collective bargaining for entire classes of employees, limited the scope of bargaining, made 
it more difficult to collect dues from members, removed the requirement that non-members 
pay a representation/agency fee, and created multiple barriers to union activity. 
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Table 4: State Party Control 2017 
State Party Controla 
Democratic Control Republican Control Divided 
California Alabama Alaska 
Delaware Arizona Colorado 
Hawaii Arkansas Connecticut 
New York Florida Illinois 
Oregon Georgia Louisiana 
Rhode Island Idaho Maine 
Washington Indiana Maryland 
  Iowa Massachusetts 
  Kansas Minnesota 
  Kentucky Montana 
  Michigan Nebraska 
  Mississippi Nevada 
  Missouri New Jersey 
  New Hampshire New Mexico 
  North Dakota North Carolina 
  Ohio Pennsylvania 
  Oklahoma Vermont 
  South Carolina Virginia 
  South Dakota West Virginia 
  Tennessee   
  Texas   
  Utah   
  Wisconsin   
  Wyoming   
a Derived from National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) 2017 State & Legislative Partisan 
Composition, March 1, 2017, 9 am,  
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/documents/ elections/Legis_Control_2017_March_1_9%20am.pdf. 
*Notes: Alaska House – controlled by coalition w/Democratic functional control; Connecticut Senate 
– Lieutenant Governor Wyman (Democrat) casts tie-breaking votes; Nebraska – Unicameral, non-
partisan legislature; New York Senate – controlled by coalition w/Republican functional control; 
Washington Senate – controlled by coalition w/Republican functional control; Vermont’s House – in-
cludes 6 Independents and 7 Progressives. 
 
Although favourable laws and policies alone are not enough to spur union growth, restrictive 
laws and policies can weaken unions (Goldfield & Bromsen, 2013). The early adopters of an-
ti-union legislation set the pattern that other states and local governments followed. Labour 
unions responded to the assault on public sector collective bargaining rights in various ways 
including public protests, election recalls, ballot initiatives, and court challenges. These efforts 
had mixed results. Public sector unions in Wisconsin accomplished recalls of five legislators, 
but the effort to recall Governor Walker was unsuccessful. Public sector unions in Ohio 
formed a coalition and successfully repealed the restrictive law through a popular referendum. 
However, both Michigan and Wisconsin subsequently passed right-to-work legislation.  
Table 5 demonstrates the relentless efforts to undermine public sector collective bar-
gaining rights over the period of 2011-2016. The NCSL identifies 14 categories of legisla-
tion related to collective bargaining. Some bills fall under multiple categories and/or are 
carried over from year-to-year. These increased counts are reflected in the data. 
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Table 5: Anti-Union Legislation Introduced 2011-2016 
State Negotiations Wages/Benefits 
Right-to-Work/ 
Membership 
Dues Collection/ 
Agency Fee 
Political Activities/ 
Contributions 
Alabama 0 0 6 0 0 
Alaska 0 4 2 3 6 
Arizona 3 2 8 21 9 
Arkansas 1 1 0 0 0 
California 8 23 3 11 8 
Colorado 0 0 6 2 0 
Connecticut 2 6 5 7 4 
Delaware 1 1 2 0 0 
Florida 6 1 0 3 2 
Georgia 0 0 3 1 0 
Hawaii 14 296 11 7 1 
Idaho 3 0 0 2 1 
Illinois 19 29 15 11 6 
Indiana 0 2 8 8 2 
Iowa 6 16 9 22 3 
Kansas 4 0 2 4 4 
Kentucky 0 2 4 0 0 
Louisiana 0 0 0 2 0 
Maine 4 5 22 20 6 
Maryland 1 4 10 9 1 
Massachusetts 22 16 8 28 3 
Michigan 3 20 7 24 6 
Minnesota 4 11 3 16 3 
Mississippi 0 0 2 1 0 
Missouri 1 0 42 30 11 
Montana 2 0 7 6 1 
Nebraska 0 0 0 2 2 
Nevada 4 2 1 3 0 
New Hampshire 14 5 31 33 4 
New Jersey 16 19 13 20 28 
New Mexico 0 1 8 6 0 
New York 16 30 8 4 2 
North Carolina 0 0 5 5 0 
North Dakota 1 0 0 1 0 
Ohio 0 0 9 9 2 
Oklahoma 0 0 2 11 1 
Oregon 1 7 1 3 1 
Pennsylvania 5 8 15 31 10 
Rhode Island 4 16 8 10 1 
South Carolina 0 0 6 6 2 
South Dakota 0 0 2 4 0 
Tennessee 2 1 6 14 10 
Texas 0 1 0 4 4 
Utah 1 1 0 3 0 
Vermont 4 7 0 6 5 
Virginia 0 1 15 2 0 
Washington 7 8 7 5 0 
West Virginia 0 0 12 2 2 
Wisconsin 4 9 4 8 4 
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 1 
Totals 183 555 338 430 156 
Source: NCSL Collective Bargaining and Labor Union Legislation Database 
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Table 6: Changes in State Union Density 2008-2015 
State 2008 2015 Change 
Alabama 29.8 33.8 4 
Alaska 55.6 41.8 -13.8 
Arizona 19.2 17.0 -2.2 
Arkansas 16.0 15.6 -0.4 
California 57.3 55.0 -2.3 
Colorado 22.0 17.0 -5 
Connecticut 63.0 65.6 2.6 
Delaware 38.7 34.9 -3.8 
Florida 28.0 27.5 -0.5 
Georgia 8.7 11.5 2.8 
Hawaii 54.3 50.0 -4.3 
Idaho 16.7 18.4 1.7 
Illinois 50.3 53.2 2.9 
Indiana 27.4 27.4 0 
Iowa 31.3 27.6 -3.7 
Kansas 16.6 22.9 6.3 
Kentucky 16.3 23.7 7.4 
Louisiana 13.3 16.9 3.6 
Maine 45.2 50.8 5.6 
Maryland 30.9 28.8 -2.1 
Massachusetts 61.0 59.2 -1.8 
Michigan 57.3 48.4 -8.9 
Minnesota 55.0 47.4 -7.6 
Mississippi 9.4 9.4 0 
Missouri 23.3 22.1 -1.2 
Montana 38.5 35.8 -2.7 
Nebraska 27.3 25.9 -1.4 
Nevada 36.5 32.4 -4.1 
New Hampshire 47.8 46.7 -1.1 
New Jersey 62.1 56.0 -6.1 
New Mexico 16.0 13.8 -2.2 
New York 70.5 68.6 -1.9 
North Carolina 11.0 10.1 -0.9 
North Dakota 16.3 14.8 -1.5 
Ohio 40.6 38.4 -2.2 
Oklahoma 18.0 15.4 -2.6 
Oregon 59.9 50.8 -9.1 
Pennsylvania 52.9 49.9 -3 
Rhode Island 61.9 61.8 -0.1 
South Carolina 10.9 7.2 -3.7 
South Dakota 16.6 22.8 6.2 
Tennessee 16.0 19.0 3 
Texas 15.0 16.6 1.6 
Utah 15.5 12.5 -3 
Vermont 40.2 50.7 10.5 
Virginia 9.3 13.7 4.4 
Washington 51.0 46.1 -4.9 
West Virginia 25.3 26.3 1 
Wisconsin 47.7 26.1 -21.6 
Wyoming 13.2 13.7 0.5 
Source: Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson (2016) Union Membership, Coverage, Density, 
and Employment by State and Sector, 1983‒2015, http://www.unionstats.com/ 
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The focus here is on the categories most detrimental to public sector unions’ viability. 
These include: negotiations, wages/benefits, right-to-work/membership, dues/agency fee, 
and political contributions. It is expected that the legislation in these categories negatively 
impacts unions’ ability to represent, recruit and retain members, collect dues, and exercise 
political power. 
During this period, bills were introduced with restrictions in the following areas: nego-
tiations (183), wages/benefits (555), right-to-work/membership (338), dues/agency fee 
(430), and political activities/contributions (156). The total number of occurrences of at-
tempts to restrict collective bargaining during this period was 1662. The number of at-
tempts per state ranges from one to 329. The average number of bills per state was 33.  
The following 14 states (ranked lowest to highest) had above average numbers of at-
tempts to modify public sector collective bargaining rights: Minnesota, Rhode Island, Ari-
zona, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Illinois, Missouri, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Hawaii. Of these states, 12 experienced a decline in union 
density. Thus, the evidence supports proposition 5.  
Around the world union density has decreased due to a decline in manufacturing and 
the replacement of workers by technology (Wilson, 2012). In the U.S., the decline in union 
density has been even more pronounced due to the failure of the American state to protect 
collective bargaining rights and the willingness to implement austerity measures. State and 
local governments eliminated approximately 730,000 jobs between 2007 and 2013. Overall, 
public sector union density dropped from 36.5 in 2008 to 35.2 in 2015 (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2009, 2016). 
The degree of loss varies from state to state. Table 6 shows the change in union density 
for all 50 states. From 2008 to 2015 union density declined in 32 states. Some of the steep-
est declines were in northern and western states that had previously been union-friendly 
such as Wisconsin (-21.6), Alaska (-13.8), Oregon (-9.1), Michigan (-8.9), Minnesota (-
7.6), and New Jersey (-6.1). Union density remained constant in two states and increased in 
16 states, with Vermont showing a gain of 10 percentage points.  
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Although it is not possible to establish causation, it is clear that the changes in the socioec-
onomic environment, political culture, and labour relations policy context are related to 
changes in state and local unionization. Public sector unions in the U.S. face a number of 
ongoing threats and challenges. First, the strength of public employees and public sector 
unions made them a prime target of the conservative right. Unlike private sector employees 
who forfeit their citizenship rights on acceptance of employment, public sector employees 
in the U.S. retain their constitutional and civil rights in the work place, as well as property 
rights to their jobs.  
Second, public sector unions play a critical role in policymaking at all levels of gov-
ernment through political activities. These include policy advocacy, contributions to politi-
cal campaigns, participation in voter turnout drives, and the exercise of discretion in im-
plementing policies. Yet, politicians and conservative interest groups have portrayed public 
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sector unions as obstacles to government effectiveness and efficiency whose participation 
and influence on policies should be restricted. 
Public sector jobs have provided a career ladder for women and racial minorities. Tra-
ditionally public sector employment has provided job security. This benefits public sector 
employers by facilitating efficiency and continuity in service delivery. It also benefits 
workers by providing uninterrupted material benefits and protection from arbitrary dismis-
sals (Peters, 2001). The retrenchment of civil service protections and collective bargaining 
rights will increase both groups’ vulnerability to discriminatory job dismissals and will 
most likely increase gender and racial inequality in public employment. 
The decline of unions harms all workers. Over the period of 1973-2007 union member-
ship declined in the U.S. During the same timeframe, wage inequality increased by 40 percent 
(Western & Rosenfeld, 2011). Rising inequality has impacted less-educated, blue-collar, male 
workers most severely. This group of workers is particularly resentful of the progress women, 
African Americans, and public sector workers have made (Hochschild, 2016).  
In addition to raising wages, unions promote norms of equity. They do this in three im-
portant ways. From a cultural perspective, unions foster a public discussion about economic 
equality. From a political perspective, unions influence social policies. From an institution-
al perspective, unions establish rules that guide the labour market (Western & Rosenfeld, 
2011). 
If public sector unions are to survive, they will need to help rebuild strength in private 
sector unions, so that displaced private sector workers do not see good jobs for public sec-
tor workers as a threat to their own financial wellbeing. Increasingly unions will have to 
devote more resources to political and legislative lobbying due to competition from other 
interest groups and to policy challenges at the state, local, and federal levels such as right-
to-work laws. The passage of right-to-work legislation in Missouri in 2017 is the most re-
cent example of the continued onslaught. Public sector unions will also need to advocate for 
both labour-specific issues and broader social issues.  
Although alternative labour groups have waged successful campaigns to advocate for a 
living wage and improvements in working conditions for hard-to-organize groups such as 
fast-food employees, retail employees, taxi drivers, and car wash workers, labour unions 
remain the most prominent non-market institution promoting voice at work and economic 
justice. Like any other institution, public sector unions are imperfect. Critics contend that 
they wield inordinate political power and put their own interests above the public good. 
At the same time, the potential for abuse is counterbalanced by legal constraints de-
signed to prevent public sector unions from becoming too powerful. For example, little 
Hatch acts limit public employees’ political activities and campaign finance laws place re-
strictions on unions’ abilities to contribute to political action committees. Interestingly, 
some of public sector unions’ most visible victories in recent years have been in specific 
cases where unions formed coalitions with community members to promote the public 
good, such as the Oregon SEIU Local 503’s approach to bargaining which includes de-
mands for undergraduate tuition caps and the Chicago Teachers Union’s successful 2012 
campaign for smaller classes and better student support services.  
The erosion of formalized collective bargaining rights undermines the ability of unions, 
alternative labour groups, and community coalitions to participate in democratic processes. 
468 Patrice M. Mareschal 
Working conditions, standards of living, and participation in civil society and the political 
arena, are issues of public concern and elements of full citizenship. Public sector unions 
will have to make the case that all workers benefit from full citizenship rights and the race-
to-the-bottom approach degrades all workers. Government should be a model employer. If 
government does not respect basic norms of fairness, constitutional rights, and citizenship 
rights for its own workers, how can it compel private sector employers to abide by policies 
intended to ensure fairness in the workplace and protect workers’ rights such as wage and 
hour laws, health and safety regulations, and anti-discrimination provisions? By promoting 
full citizenship rights for all, public sector unions may be able to restore a more equitable 
balance of power between workers and management that is necessary for a robust political 
democracy. 
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